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tional expression" (615) must be carrying us along on a stream of such 
judgments. While Nussbaum does not agree with Deryck Cooke that 
music is so language-like that propositions can be formed of it, she does 
find it necessary, in explicating Mahler's ascent, to make considerable ref-
erence to his three "programs" for the Second Symphony, as well as to per-
sonal and social occurrences during the time of its composing. While 
telling a story about a piece of music does require some kind of representa-
tionalism, just as telling the story about an emotion does, it does not seem 
particularly helpful to understand the music itself as representational, or to 
think one is understanding it better as music to be able to tell such a story. 
If we consider Cooke's analogy, the language of music seems to be (unfor-
tunately for Cooke) all syntax, no semantic. So Nussbaum's suggestion 
(against all of Mahler's revised programs) that the symphony is exploring 
"the contrast between the expression of the self in society and its purer and 
richer expression through solitary personal striving" for which "it is crucial 
for it to contain not only the sardonic and grotesque account of society that 
the third movement will provide, but also a reminder of society at its 
best-... the first movement" (623), gives us a clear and cleverly wrought set 
of representations to consider along with the music, but that the music is 
about this intentional history in any way seems simply an outrageous 
claim. I very much enjoyed Walt Disney's original version of "Fantasia"-
but the title is telling, and true. Any number of dreams might go along 
with this music, but such particularity of intention is fantastic. If the point 
of Mahler's ode and the music were to "depict the movements, the very 
being, of the striving heart as ends in themselves" (637), something which 
"glorifies striving rather than promising the static possession of an object" 
(638), one would be tempted to ask of it "striving for what?" But as it is 
music, one does not respond to it as if it were a thesis or a judgment. 
Perhaps the emotions it elicits are otherwise also. 
NOTES 
1. Lodge, David, Thinks . .. (New York: Viking-Penguin, 2001), Pp. 69. 
Faith and Narrative, edited by Keith Yandell. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 288. $52.00. 
KELLY CLARK, Calvin College 
Narrative is among the hottest topics in continental philosophy, ethics, lit-
erary theory, biblical studies, theology and any number of areas of human-
istic concern. The claims of narrativists run from the near-obvious (for 
example, history is best understood in a narrative context) to the highly 
controversial (the Biblical narrative clearly shows a God who forgets, gets 
angry and depends on human agents to accomplish God's purposes), to 
the outlandish (the self is a narration). We find narrative everywhere these 
days (everywhere, that is, except in analytic philosophy which has not paid 
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much heed to narrative). 
This antipathy toward narrative is not surprising given the general ten-
dency among analytic philosophers to extract the essential propositions 
from a text and examine their cogency. If propositions are necessarily time-
less, then arguments can be excised from the contingency of the narrative 
in which they are embedded; who said thus and so and when it was said 
have very little bearing on the soundness of arguments. Continental phi-
losophy, however, with its emphasis on the history of ideas, seems con-
cerned with the inescapability of tradition and the existential aspect of 
philosophical questioning. In other words, continental philosophers are 
more concerned with contingency than necessity. These two styles of phi-
losophy have hardened into competing definitions or visions of philoso-
phy, with each side firmly believing that only they love sophia. In the 
ensuing battles, the analytic philosopher reads continental philosophy and 
exclaims: "Where's the argument?" The continental philosopher reads ana-
lytic philosophy and exclaims: "Where's the context?" 
One might resolve the tension between analytic and continental 
approaches in a variety of ways. The typical means of "resolution" is war-
fare. Departments are notoriously split and acrimonious on these matters. 
Anger, disdain and snide comments rule. No attempt is made to under-
stand the other approach except by virtue of caricature followed (or pre-
ceded) by facile dismissal. If William James is right, however, philosophi-
cal convictions and approaches are matters of temperament not logic or 
rational insight. Although for James the major philosophical expressions of 
different temperaments are the soft-minded (rationalists) and the hard-
minded (empiricists), there are certainly other possible divisions, including 
the continental! analytic division. If James is right, one's philosophical pref-
erences may cut one off from important truths, thereby narrowing one's 
world. So a more Jamesian view of philosophy would suggest a dialogical 
model as opposed to the warfare model. The important truths of one per-
spective should be made available to and appropriated by the other per-
spective. The dialogical model will proceed with respect, patience, sympa-
thetic listening, openness to insights and appreciation of difference. With a 
few notable exceptions, one seldom finds the dialogical model on display 
in the Anglo-American context. 
I take Faith and Narrative as an instance of the dialogical model. 
Although continental-analytic dialogue is not the topic of the book, one 
topic-narrative-is one that finds dramatically more enthusiasm and 
attention among continental philosophers. With its emphasis on the history 
of the import of ideas and the existential aspects of the individual, it is not 
surprising to find a great deal of use of and speculation on the nature of 
narrative. Faith, on the other hand, has found more fertile soil, perhaps 
ironically, in analytic philosophy. This collection of essays discusses the 
promise and power of narrative from a variety of perspectives-of the his-
torian, literature professor, psychologist, theologian, and of continental 
and analytic philosophers. The authors include Lamin Sanneh, David L. 
Jeffrey, George Steiner, Eleonore Stump, James Billington, Robert E. 
Frykenberg, John B. Carman, Paul Vitz, Jon N. Moline, Gabriel Fackre, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Paul Griffiths and Keith Yandell. I suspect readers 
408 Faith and Philosophy 
of Faith and Philosophy will find the essays by nonphilosophers occasionally 
parochial and thin on argument but strong on assertion. Sanneh on the his-
tory of translations of the bible in Africa (into English or native languages) 
and Carman on whether or not India has a history seem rather thin philo-
sophically. And Jeffries' and Steiner's essays are strong on assertion. As far 
as contributing to the goal of dialogue, analytic readers will likely find 
Steiner's opaque essay difficult to comprehend while continental readers 
will find Yandell's essay unduly technical. The best balance is struck in 
Eleonore Stump's wonderful essay, "Second-Person Accounts and the 
Problem of Evil," Moline's simple yet insightful, "Words, Deeds, and 
Words Without Deeds" and Paul Griffith's "The Limits of Narrative 
Theology." These essays also directly engage the book's theme. 
Yandell claims that the theme of the book is the role of narrative in 
knowledge: "Does narrative discourse provide enjoyment and persuasion 
but fail us when we tum to it for reliable information? Do narratives yield 
knowledge available from no other sources" (3) Few of the essays actually 
treat the theme directly. And, curiously, except for Stump and those who 
recount historical events, there is very little sense given to what is commu-
nicated in narrative that cannot be communicated discursively. So it is dif-
ficult to judge, for example from Gabriel Fackre's defense of evangelical 
narrative theology ("the linkage of the Christian Story to the believer's 
story through biblical stories" (193-194)), just what such a theology 
involves. Presumably it must say something about what Fackre calls the 
Big Story of covenant and redemption, but what? Let me give an example: 
how do we treat God as a character in the Big Story? If we take narrative 
seriously and scripture as infallible, should we accept at face value and 
shape our theology around those narratives that indicate that God has a 
body, forgets, is capricious and is the source of evil? If not, then in what 
sense is narrative theology essential to, say, systematic theology? Fackre is 
silent on these matters. Some discussion of matters such as these (or the 
Trinity or Incarnation) would be useful for determining in what sense nar-
rative is theologically regulative or if knowledge on these important theo-
logical matters is or can be supported narratively (and in no other way). 
Before proceeding further, it might behoove us to define 
"narrative." According to Griffiths, narrative is "a diachronically ordered 
representation of a series of states of affairs, a representation that makes it 
possible ... to perceive the series ... as meaningful" (219). History and self-
understanding seem necessarily narratival: a succession of events are 
ordered in such a way as to make events and the self significant. Stories are 
selected, arranged in (an) order with the intent of revealing their purposive 
or teleological structure. Here the specter of Dilthey and Heidegger loom 
large (although Dilthey is never mentioned and Heidegger is scarce). 
Aside from the historians, Stump makes the most compelling case that 
something informational is communicated through narrative. Stump 
believes that such "information" is communicated through a second-per-
son account. A second person account is a narrative re-presenting of some-
one else's second-person experience. What is a second person experience? 
Contra at least third-person accounts, the primary mode of communication 
is experiential, not cognitive. It is hard to say exactly what a second person 
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experience might be, so Stump proceeds by telling a story. Here's an exam-
ple. In a time of crisis, a teenager may feel ignored by her father. And so 
believes that her father does not loves her. I've just described the situation 
in the third person. The first person account is her own belief, my father 
doesn't love me. Now it may be true that her father does indeed love her and 
suppose her therapist tries to persuade the teenager that her father loves 
her (with third-person accounts): Your father was present at your birth, he 
bought you that sweater. ... It is not unlikely that such third-person 
accounts will produce little effect. So how can the love of the father be com-
municated to the teenager? Suppose the teenager comes home distraught 
because her boyfriend has broken up with her. Her father, seeing her dis-
tress, gives her a sympathetic look and a compassionate hug. He tells her 
as he did when she was a toddler: "Everything will be alright." And in that 
embrace she knows that her father loves her. In this sort of situation the 
father may also impart information in the third-person, but such informa-
tion will likely prove frail compared to the second-person experience of 
fatherly commitment and compassion. 
Stump rejects the common claim that the Book of Job does not answer 
the questions it raises. She contends that Job gets both a second-person 
experience of God and an account of the non-human world's second-per-
son experience of God. In Job's case it took both (I suspect the former was 
vastly more important to Job than the latter). What is it that second-person 
accounts add to second-person experiences? The narratives provide the 
means for locating one's second-person experience in a meaningful pat-
tern. They give it sense in terms of beginning, middle and end. But the sec-
ond-person experience does most of the work. The second-person account 
shows that God's relationship to all of his creatures is personal and 
parental. The model of divine goodness that she mines is the maternal 
model. From this she contends: "Now a good mother will sometimes allow 
the children she loves to suffer-but only in case the suffering benefits the 
child who experiences the suffering, and benefits him in some way that 
couldn't have been equally well achieved without the suffering" (96). So 
Job, always aware of God's awesome power, gets an account of what he 
doubted: God's goodness. In its affective dimension it includes "informa-
tion" which could not be communicated discursively. I've only touched the 
surface of Stump's rich and insightful essay. Fortunately, we will learn a 
great deal more of Stump's narrative approach to the problem of evil in the 
published form of her Gifford Lectures. 
This collection concludes with two well-argued cautionary essays. 
Griffiths and Yandell argue "narrative is not everything." Griffiths, in "The 
Limits of Narrative Theology," is sympathetic to the power, use and occa-
sional indispensability of narrative but contends that it cannot account for 
all of our claims to knowledge. In theology, narrative cannot do justice to 
the religious community's impulse to develop systematic, atemporal 
creeds and doctrines to define and sustain the community. In addition, 
narrative is a poor substitute for apologetics. Yandell's "Narrative Ethics 
and Normative Objectivity" is a circuitous critique of the claim that ethics 
is narrative all the way down. Yandell shows that narrative ethics floats on 
a sea of non-narrative, ahistorical principles as well as claims about the 
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nature of persons. These principles allow for principled judgment of the 
many competing ethical narratives on offer. 
Let me conclude with my own cautionary note. Although the necessity 
of narrative seems clear, the possibility of error looms large. Robert 
Frykenberg, in his essay on history seems aware of this problem as indicat-
ed by his use of scare-quotes in the following statement: "Narrative, if fully 
appreciated and comprehended in all of its manifold or subtle implica-
tions, becomes the quintessentially ideal vehicle for acquainting people 
with-and for the acquisition and transmission of-'true' understandings 
of the past" (117). Our memories and our history are necessarily selective 
and there is, as Griffiths notes, an infinite number of possible orders for 
any selected set of data. So narrative is risky business plagued with under-
determination, presuppositions and self-deception (it is not at all clear to 
me that non-narrative philosophy is immune). These sorts of concerns 
dampen enthusiasm for, for example, Jeffries' use of repentance narratives 
to critique gnostic readings of scripture, because repentance narratives 
"explicitly insist on being read as in some fundamental sense 'realistic'" 
(54). And they also ameliorate Frykenerg's optimism that narratives pro-
vide "true" understandings of the past as well as Steiner's claim that there 
is no difference between sacred and secular texts. 
Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures 1986-1998, Calvin College and 
Calvin Theological Seminary. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2001. Pp. x and 550, $35.00 (hardcover). 
DAVID FLETCHER, Wheaton College 
Before Nicholas Wolterstorff, Richard Mouw, or Alvin Plantinga ever taught 
Christian philosophy at Calvin College, appreciative generations of students 
learned it from Professor Henry Stob. The Stob Lectures are an annual event 
at Calvin College and Seminary to recognize this distinguished alumnus and 
professor of both institutions who to judge by the tributes paid him had a 
profound influence on many current leaders in Christian thought. The lec-
tures, delivered in the fields of ethics, apologetics, and philosophical theolo-
gy, have drawn a particularly stellar roster of Christian thinkers. This vol-
ume collects the lectures given in the years 1986-1998, a particularly rich time 
in the current flowering of Christian thought in the United States at the end 
of the twentieth century. (Annual sets of lectures since 1999 will be pub-
lished in individual volumes by Eerdmans.) The thirteen scholars who con-
tributed to this book are diverse in terms of academic specialty, theological 
perspective, and institutional background, but philosophers, Reformed 
thinkers, and those with Calvin institutional roots predominate. Philosophy 
is represented by Dewey J. Hoitinga, Jr. of Grand Valley State University, 
Arthur Holmes of Wheaton College, Peter Kreeft of Boston College, George 
Mavrodes of the University of Michigan, Alvin Plantinga of the University of 
Notre Dame, Eleanore Stump of St. Louis University, and Nicholas P. 
Wolterstorff of Yale University Divinity School. Theologians include James 
M. Gustafson, Emory University, Martin E. Marty, University of Chicago 
